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Abstract 
The last two decades have been characterised by significant changes in national 
pension arrangements. While at first, a consensus seemed to be evolving around a 
one-size-fits-all reform, more recently the trend has been towards a better 
customisation of reforms. This paper reviews this process, focusing on five pension 
policy design issues. These are how policymakers have sought to optimise poverty 
alleviation effectiveness; the redefinition of the state‘s role in smoothing incomes over 
the life-course; the balancing of contributions to benefits; adjusting the system to be 
more responsive to demographic, economic and social changes; and ensuring that 
reforms will be long-lasting.  
While the role of state pensions still appears to be on a diminishing path, there has 
been a growing realisation of the need to ensure that they remain adequate. This has 
led to the setting up of innovative minimum pension schemes and credits for periods 
of childcare and unemployment. The expanding role of private pensions has also led 
governments to intervene more in their operation. Policymakers have shown strong 
interest in automatic adjustment mechanisms, to try to bring about required economic 
changes. However there is greater understanding that for the latter to happen, the 
state has to engage more with its citizens. While changes in pension systems can 
help societies respond to the ageing transition, for instance by removing incentives to 
retire too early or by aligning better the generosity of benefits to contributions made, 
there will need to be a much broader policy response. 
 
Keywords 
Social Security and Public Pensions; Retirement; Poverty; Retirement Policies 
JEL number: H55, I38, J26 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
Aaron George Grech works at the Modelling & Research Office of the Central Bank 
of Malta and is a visiting research fellow at the LSE‟s Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent 
those of the organisations with which he is affiliated. The author thanks John Hills, 
Uwe Fachinger and Nicholas Barr for their comments.   
  
Email address: a.g.grech@lse.ac.uk  
 3 
1 Introduction 
At their inception, pensions were not seen as a social benefit for the masses. Rather, 
they started as deferred payment for preferred workers (such as civil servants).1 
Collective bargaining and political movements gradually spread this benefit more 
broadly. These programmes also started to merge or overlap with social assistance 
or charity schemes, which had tended to be geared towards the elderly. However, 
even with the great expansion of the welfare state in the New Deal in the US and in 
the post-war era in Europe, pensions still remained mainly an insurance kind of 
welfare benefit, as relatively few survived to pension age and for not very long.2 All 
this changed with the lengthening of life spans after the 1950s, which transformed 
pensions into a benefit which would be accessed by most citizens. 
Just as this happened, the capacity of economies to provide them began to be called 
into question.3 This reflects growing concern of the impact of the ageing process – 
caused by the combination of the retirement of the Baby Boom generation, the 
decline in fertility rates and the acceleration in longevity improvements. Besides 
potentially boosting pension spending, this transition is expected to have significant 
economic effects.4 However, as Hering (2006) notes, while all countries face similar 
demographic trends, governments have responded differently, with some changing 
the parameters of their systems, while others transforming them into something very 
different. This suggests that reforms also reflected the preferences and options of 
governments. For instance, reforms carried out in Central and Eastern Europe 
focused on shifting the responsibility of retirement income provision unto individuals, 
in an attempt to spur the growth of private enterprise and deepen financial and 
capital markets.5 Moves towards tighter links between contributions and benefits 
have been justified as resulting in actuarially fair pension systems with correct 
incentives for individuals to contribute and work. Other reforms have tried to reflect 
social changes, such as the move away from a male breadwinner model in a full-
                                            
1
 One of the first pension schemes was set up for Royal Navy officers in the 1670s.  
2
  Back in 1950, just 7.7% of the population in more developed regions was over 65, according 
to the United Nation‘s World Population Prospects database. Life expectancy at birth in 1950-
55 was just 64.7. 
3
  IMF (2011) suggests that spending on pensions in advanced economies nearly doubled 
between 1970 and 1990, growing by 3.1% of GDP mainly due to increased generosity, though 
ageing also contributed. Since 1990 there has been an increase of just 0.2%, as the growing 
impact of ageing was countered by a higher labour participation, tightening eligibility conditions 
and a less generous growth in generosity. 
4  Maddaloni et al (2006) suggest that in the absence of reforms, under the assumption of an 
unchanged rate of labour utilisation and productivity growth, demographic trends imply a 
decline in average real GDP growth for 2020-2050 in the euro area to 1%, from the average of 
2% observed in 1980-2005. 
5
  There has been a long academic debate on funding pension systems. Feldstein (1974) argues 
that social security taxes distort labour supply and lead to lower saving, while the system‘s 
implicit rate of return is lower than that on saving. These arguments have been countered by 
Orzsag & Stiglitz (1999) and Barr (2000). 
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employment economy, and adjust systems to new realities by individualising pension 
claims and providing more flexibility.6  
The scope of this paper is to review some of these changes and delineate broad 
policy lessons. Starting by looking at the purposes pensions serve, the paper then 
asks five system design questions and provides an overview of the different answers 
policymakers have adopted. The main conclusion, besides the usual ‗one size does 
not fit all‘ argument, is that to be sustainable, solutions need to be framed clearly in 
terms of the objectives and constraints that the specific pension system has. Unless 
citizens are made aware of what their pension system can deliver and at what cost, it 
is unlikely that solutions can work beyond the very immediate term. As policy 
reversals in countries as far afield as the UK, Chile and Hungary attest, not getting 
this right the first time means having to start again a few years down the line. Only if 
economic behaviour changes in response to an acceptance of policy changes can 
solutions prove long-lasting. 
2 What purpose do pensions serve? How much has 
changed over the last decades?  
Pension plans have a relatively long history, but they became more common in the 
wake of industrialisation and urbanisation. Holzmann & Hinz (2005) portray the rise of 
modern systems as a reaction to the socioeconomic changes of the nineteenth 
century, noting that ―as individuals moved out of the traditional agricultural family 
structure, there was a need to establish formal risk management arrangements that 
could substitute for the informal arrangements that were eroding in the face of the 
transition‖.7 State income-transfer programmes towards the elderly can be traced to 
the late nineteenth century, first in Germany and Denmark. The reasons why 
pensions were established in these two countries differed significantly. In Germany, 
Chancellor Bismarck was interested in ―tying workers‘ interests to the new German 
state‖,8 while the Danish scheme was introduced as a locally administered means-
tested scheme for needy citizens over age 60. This distinction reflects two different 
aims – in the German case: a need for income stability over the life-course, and in 
the Danish case: a need to alleviate poverty during old age. These two aims have 
characterised pension systems throughout the decades, and while some systems 
remain in policy rhetoric focused on one particular aim, nowadays, most pension 
systems serve both purposes.9  
Barr & Diamond (2006) argue that ―from an individual viewpoint, income security in 
old age requires two types of instruments: a mechanism for consumption smoothing, 
and a means of insurance‖. The first purpose involves the transfer of consumption 
                                            
6
  See De Graaf et al (2007). 
7
  Caucutt et al (2007) also explains the emergence of social security in the US in terms of the 
population shift from rural to urban areas. 
8
  See Palacios & Sluchynsky (2006).  
9
  Ove Moene & Wallerstein (2003) studies empirically the importance of these two roles in 
shaping pension (and other social) expenditures in OECD countries. 
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from productive middle years to retired years, allowing one to choose the preferred 
time path of consumption over working and retired life. Barr & Diamond (2006) further 
contend that ―a second reason for government involvement (in pensions) is that 
public policy generally has objectives additional to improving consumption smoothing 
and insurance, notably poverty relief and redistribution‖. Thus pensions serve as a 
means to target resources on people who are poor on a lifetime basis and also 
redistribute incomes on a lifetime basis (subsidising the consumption smoothing of 
low-income individuals). Pension systems can, moreover, be used to redistribute 
across generations. Besides these primary objectives, policymakers have secondary 
goals mostly relating to the effect of the system on economic behaviour in labour and 
capital markets, and to create incentives for socially required, but unpaid, activities 
such as caring and child rearing. If not conceived as aims, these effects can be seen 
as constraints. Thus if a system results in too high tax rates, it would adversely affect 
economic growth, while a system that provides very generous benefits may displace 
private saving and thus result in smaller capital markets.  
The main constraint on pension systems is the financial resources allocated for this 
purpose. From the very beginning, this factor played an important role in shaping 
pension policy. In most countries when pensions were established, governments 
established specific taxes or contributions to finance them. These concerns persisted 
over time and systems in some countries (such as the UK and Australia) took a 
relatively long time to move beyond a basic poverty alleviation role or tended to 
involve private sector employers (rather than the state) in income replacement. The 
pre-funding of pension promises also tended to be quite common and in some British 
ex-colonies, such as Singapore and Malaysia, has survived to this day. In most 
countries, this hypothecation of tax revenue or pre-funding shifted towards the pay-
as-you-go scheme (PAYG) of financing pensions, when the coverage and generosity 
of pension schemes was boosted in the post-war years. More recently, this shift has 
been depicted as an attempt by the post-war generation to play a Ponzi game with 
the burden of paying for pensions being shifted unsustainably to future generations.10  
At the start of the 1990s one model dominated Europe. Pensions were run by the 
state, based on PAYG funding and with earnings-related defined benefit (DB) 
determination. There were variants – for instance Germany‘s points system,11 
                                            
10
  See for instance, Disney (2000). This depiction has been criticised. For instance, Hills (1995) 
argues that rather than depicting PAYG as an exploding ‗chain letter‘, one would be more 
correct in thinking of it as a single line of people passing a box of chocolates to each other. 
Unless someone panics in the interval between passing on their original box and receiving 
their neighbour‘s and stops the game, there would be no losers. Thus ―provided the line 
carries on indefinitely and that no one changes the rules‖ PAYG need not be unsustainable. 
This does not necessarily apply when one has a shrinking population, as here the line 
becomes less populated. 
11
  Under a points system, entitlement is based on pension points accumulated. A year‘s 
contribution at the average earnings earns one point. Points are multiplied by a pension value 
to determine the monthly benefit. 
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Ireland‘s flat rate system,12 and the Dutch state system supported by quasi-
mandatory occupational provision. However throughout most of the second half of 
the twentieth century, reforms in Europe had tended to move countries closer to this 
single pension model, with even Beveridgean countries,13 like the UK, introducing 
earnings-related features, and countries in Southern Europe moving away from 
traditional methods of family support during old-age. The 1990s, however, saw a 
clear break in this trend. European Commission (2010a) includes a comprehensive 
review of this break, noting that the main features involved the strengthening of 
contributory principles, a greater role for pre-funding, the establishment of automatic 
adjustment or periodic review mechanisms, changes in coverage, minimum income 
provision and indexation, increasing complexity and a closer link with the labour 
market.14  
Hering (2006) notes that ―two-thirds of the fifteen old EU countries reproduced their 
pension systems by enacting numerous marginal adjustment measures, focusing 
either on the refinancing or retrenchment of public pensions…but four countries—
Sweden, Italy, Germany and Austria—restructured their pension systems by cutting 
public pensions and replacing these increasingly with private ones, and thus began a 
gradual shift from the dominant pillar model to the multi-pillar one‖. Besides these 
countries, many Eastern European countries also opted for systemic reforms, i.e. 
moving away from the DB determination structure and adopting a defined 
contribution (DC) system.15 Here one can discern two types of reforms: World-Bank 
inspired multi-pillar reforms based on personal accounts (e.g. Slovakia and Hungary) 
and the adoption of Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) systems16 (e.g. Sweden, 
Italy and Poland). Some countries, while not shifting totally, have adopted some DC 
elements. For instance, France has introduced a link between the number of 
contribution years required for a full pension and life expectancy while Germany has 
adopted a sustainability factor that links the level of pension benefits to the ratio of 
benefits to contributions. 
                                            
12
  Under a flat-rate system, all those who meet the set conditions get paid the same benefits. In 
an earnings-related DB system, benefits are determined as a ratio of a set salary – the final 
salary, the average lifetime salary or an intermediate figure - on which contributions were paid.  
13
  A common categorisation of European pension schemes is between Bismarkian and 
Beveridgean systems (see Bonoli (1997)). This harks back to two different pension schemes, 
that introduced by Bismarck in Germany where pensions are related to employment and 
represent a deferred salary, and that advocated by Beveridge in the UK where pensions tend 
to be less linked to previous income and instead are meant to reduce poverty. 
14
  Zaidi et al (2006) also provides a succinct review.  
15
  In a DC system, the benefit is determined by the value of assets accumulated. These assets 
are typically invested, with capital gains/losses borne by the contributor (unless rate-of-return 
or capital guarantees are provided). Since funds are invested, they cannot be directly used to 
finance current pensions; i.e. they break the PAYG chain, and force governments to redeem 
the implicit debt of their pension systems.  
16
  In an NDC system, contributions are placed in a notional account and given a notional interest 
rate. Benefits are determined on the basis of the balance on these accounts spread over the 
expected lifetime of the individual. For an in-depth review of how NDC systems work, see 
Palmer (2006).  
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The main difference between parametric and systemic reforms lies not in the financial 
impact on pensioners (or contributors) but in the sharing of risk between the current 
generation and future ones or the state (the custodian of future generations in this 
respect). In fact, as can be seen from Table 1, the projected change in pension 
spending has tended to be quite large even in countries, such as Cyprus, Greece 
and Spain, which have focused on parametric reforms. By introducing some DC 
elements, countries like France and Germany are also converging to the projected 
spending path of countries, like Italy and Sweden with NDC systems Across the EU, 
the reforms conducted in the last 6 years are estimated to have cut the projected rise 
in spending between 2010 and 2050 from 2.5% of GDP to 1.5%. This despite that 
longevity projections have been revised upwards while potential GDP growth has 
been lowered as a result of the crisis. Recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, 
some governments have been rethinking these changes. In Latin America, Chile 
introduced a number of important changes, notably the introduction of a solidarity 
pension to provide a robust system of poverty relief.17 A number of Central and 
Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Hungary, have reversed some of 
the multi-pillar reforms.18 Moreover, as European Commission (2010b) points out 
―most automatic mechanisms have not yet been applied in practice‖ and that even 
―prior to the crisis, a few countries had already taken political decisions to postpone 
automatic adjustments‖. For instance, Italy delayed the automatic updating of life 
expectancy projections in its NDC system while Germany increased pension benefits 
beyond what was allowed by its automatic adjustment mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
17
  See Barr and Diamond (2008), pp. 239-256. 
18
  See Whitehouse (2012). 
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Table 1: Projected change in spending on pensions (2010 to 2050) 
 
2012 
report 
2009 
report 
2006 
report 
2001 
report 
Austria 2.3 1.3 -0.6 2.1 
Belgium 5.7 4.4 5.1 3.4 
Bulgaria 1.2 1.7 
  
Cyprus 6.7 8.6 12.9 
 
Czech Rep. 1.9 3.1 5.8 
 
Denmark -0.5 0.2 2.7 0.8 
Estonia -0.9 -1.1 -2.6 
 
Finland 2.9 2.6 2.5 4.3 
France 0.6 0.7 1.9 2.7* 
Germany 2.2 2.1 2.6 5.7 
Greece 1.9 12.4 
 
12.2 
Hungary 1.5 1.9 6.7 
 
Ireland 3.9 5.0 5.9 4.0 
Italy 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.2 
Latvia -3.3 0.7 0.7 
 
Lithuania 2.1 3.9 1.9 
 
Luxembourg 9.0 13.5 7.4 1.8 
Malta 3.0 3.7 -1.8 
 
Netherlands 3.6 3.8 3.6 4.5 
Poland -1.8 -1.7 -3.3 
 
Portugal 0.6 1.4 9.7 1.4 
Romania 2.9 6.4 7.3 
 
Slovakia 4.2 2.8 2.3 
 
Slovenia 6.7 8.1 2.3 
 
Spain 3.8 6.6 6.8 8.4 
Sweden 0.3 -0.6 1.1 1.1 
UK 0.5 1.4 2.0 -0.7 
EU 1.5 2.2 2.5 2.9 
* Period covered is 2010 to 2040, as 2050 projection unavailable. 
Note: Unavailable projections left blank. Countries with NDC systems are in italics. 
Source: Own workings using projections in various EU Commission Ageing Reports  
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3 Pension system design issues – the main questions 
Given that state pension systems have become the main item of government 
expenditure in many countries, and that pensioners are fast becoming the majority of 
the voting electorate in many democracies, it is not surprising that there is 
considerable literature on pension system design. The debate has been somewhat 
dominated by international economic institutions, though more recently academics 
have increasingly contributed to change this ‗consensus‘. This section will focus its 
attention on what we believe are the main system design issues and present 
examples of best practise from a number of countries. 
3.1 How to optimise poverty alleviation effectiveness?  
As mentioned previously, in some countries, state pensions evolved out of poverty 
alleviation programmes, and policymakers continue to see them mainly as an anti-
poverty measure. In other countries, where the main focus is on income smoothing, 
there tends to be some conflict between providing a good poverty alleviation function 
and the need to ensure actuarial fairness and the strict application of the contributory 
principle. There are a number of different ways in which countries have tried to tackle 
this trade-off.19 
Some countries have opted for a clear separation of roles, setting up a non-
contributory flat-rate pension which is awarded either on the basis of an income test20 
or else on other conditions such as residence or citizenship (e.g. New Zealand and 
the Netherlands). The main difference between these approaches centres on 
incentives. While means-tested systems cost less, as the more affluent are excluded, 
they may create incentives that reduce saving or work. Means-testing can also be 
difficult to implement, especially as regards income from self-employment or capital. 
Flat-rate pensions do not raise these issues as everyone gets the same, no matter 
what. However, one needs to consider that flat rate pensions need to be financed 
from somewhere, and if this is through distortionary taxation (e.g. income tax) they 
also indirectly create disincentives to work and save for taxpayers.21 That said, 
countries with flat-rate universal pensions tend to have very low levels of pensioner 
poverty (e.g. 1.5% and 2.1% in New Zealand and the Netherlands, respectively). 
The situation is even more complicated when poverty alleviation is conducted within 
the main earnings-related pension scheme. Here again there are a number of 
options. For instance, there could be a minimum pension floor/guarantee which is 
applicable to anyone who fulfils the set conditions. In many cases, these involve a 
minimum number of contribution years (e.g. the UK‘s full Basic State Pension is 
granted to those with 30 years of contributions). Even in fully funded DC schemes, 
                                            
19
  For an overview of minimum pension systems in the EU, see Social Protection Committee 
(2006). 
20
  This means-test can be quite complicated. For instance, in Australia it is combined with a 
capital test. 
21
  See Barr and Diamond (2008), pp. 113-115. 
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such as those in Chile, there are ways of granting a minimum pension, for instance 
by giving a minimum guaranteed return on assets22. The main problem with this 
approach lies in the need for people to have contributed, leaving out those with little 
labour market attachment (mostly women). To minimise this, policymakers have 
introduced a number of contribution credits, such as for years devoted to child care or 
spent in unemployment. The tension between maintaining the contributory principle 
and providing effective poverty alleviation has, however, increasingly tended to be 
resolved by the setting up of new schemes. In Chile there was the creation of the 
Solidarity Pension while, a decade earlier, the UK introduced the Pension Credit. In 
other countries, this trade-off was tackled by introducing graduated pension 
guarantees. This ensures that those with small contributory pension benefits get 
benefits higher than the guarantee. For instance, in Sweden the guarantee pension is 
withdrawn completely only for those persons whose earnings-related pension 
exceeds more than a third of average earnings. In the UK, government appears to 
want to do away with the income smoothing principle altogether and focus on 
providing a single flat rate benefit to all.  
Besides deciding on the form of minimum benefit, policymakers also need to decide 
at what level to set it. Again, there is a wide variety of approaches, which results in 
very different results.23 Some countries, like the Netherlands, link the minimum 
pension to the minimum wage, while some look at the average wage. In some cases, 
such as Estonia or Germany, policymakers refer to minimum budget standards (i.e. 
that income which would allow the consumption of a given basket of essential goods 
and services). The effectiveness of the minimum pension, however, rests crucially on 
how its value changes over time. In most countries, not only are minimum pensions 
set below the relative poverty threshold, but they are also indexed to prices, meaning 
that over time they lose their relative value. While there is considerable evidence that 
policymakers tend to raise minimum pensions above what is statutorily required,24 
indexation combined with rising longevity poses significant poverty risks for the very 
old.25 This has led some countries (such as the UK) to reinforce indexation, while 
some others (such as Malta) have introduced age-related top-ups for older 
pensioners. 
3.2 What role does the state have in smoothing income over 
the life-course?  
While there is some consensus on the role of government in alleviating pensioner 
poverty, there has traditionally been a divide on the state‘s role in smoothing income 
over the life-course. A number of countries, such as the US, Australia and the UK, 
place this role more squarely on the shoulders of individuals. However, there are a 
number of economic reasons, primarily related to adverse selection, moral hazard 
                                            
22
  See Jousten (2007). 
23
  For a comparison across the OECD, see http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370797.  
24
  See Social Protection Committee (2006) and European Commission (2010b). 
25
  See Grech (2012). 
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and myopia, why this role has been organised on a national basis.26 On a more 
technical side, it is increasingly better understood that decentralised or individualised 
income smoothing arrangements tend to come at great cost and fail to take 
advantage of economies of scale in investment and administration.27 
Despite the little agreement on what amounts to an adequate degree of income 
smoothing28, international organisations have come up with benchmarks. The ILO‘s 
1952 convention on social security benefits states that pensions should be equivalent 
to 45% of wages. Holzmann & Hinz (2005) set out the World Bank‘s view that ―for a 
typical, full-career worker, an initial target of net-of-tax income replacement from 
mandatory systems is likely to be about 40% of real earnings‖, while replacement 
rates higher than 60% are seen as unaffordable. The main issue with these 
benchmarks is that if replacement rates are the same across the wage distribution, 
this could result in higher poverty among those on low incomes. This is one of the 
main issues faced by countries that tried to make their systems more actuarially fair. 
Removing progressiveness, unless the underlying income distribution or labour 
participation is relatively equal, exacerbates poverty risks.  
Policymakers in many countries appear to be more willing to sacrifice the income 
smoothing role of state pensions than its poverty alleviation function.29 One of the 
main changes has been a move towards determining benefits on the basis of career-
average earnings rather than final or best years. This has lowered replacement rates 
for those on high earnings, especially those with strong earnings progression. Some 
countries, such as the UK, have also skewed accrual rates, by reducing them just for 
those on medium-to-high wages. In some cases (for instance in 1983 in the US), this 
was done on pensions in payment, with cost-of-living adjustments being granted just 
on small pensions. Modifying the maximum pensionable income by less than 
earnings growth while adapting a different approach to the income on which 
contributions are paid also acts against those on high incomes. While it may seem 
unfair to focus pension cuts on those on medium-to-high incomes, one needs to 
consider that compared to those on lower incomes, they are more likely to draw their 
pension and to do this for much longer periods.30 This gap appears to have increased 
in many countries, and therefore it is not certain that despite that pension cuts have 
focused on this group, its members have ended up with noticeably smaller overall 
pension transfers. 
A primary reason why policymakers may have felt more comfortable reducing income 
smoothing is that there exist several financial products that can help fulfil this role. 
                                            
26
  See Jousten (2007). 
27
  Countries that used to rely exclusively on private competition are increasingly interfering. For 
instance, in the UK after legislating caps on charges, government has set a scheme to offer a 
low-cost alternative to savers. 
28
  See Grech (2013) for a discussion of this topic. 
29
  See Grech (2014) for an analysis across EU countries. 
30
  In the UK those in the highest socio-economic groups live beyond 65 up to 3.5 years more 
than those at the bottom (see Longevity Science Advisory Panel (2012)), implying they draw 
their pension for a fifth longer. 
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The growing reliance on private pensions has, however, led governments to focus 
their attention more on the regulation of this market. For instance, in the UK, following 
a number of mis-selling incidents,31 there has been a significant emphasis on 
improving financial education, restrictions on selling/ marketing, improving 
transparency and reducing charges. Concerns about funding have also led to the 
establishment of protection funds to help reduce the impact of scheme insolvencies 
and there has been an increased focus on imposing portfolio limits. Countries that at 
first had hoped that given the right information, consumers would choose optimally, 
such as Sweden,32 have had to redraw their schemes to limit choice and focus on 
providing good default funds for those not wanting to make a choice. The shifting of 
responsibility on individuals has not resulted in a clean break for governments. In 
some cases, such as in Eastern Europe, lacklustre performance has led to partial 
reform reversals. Governments have also had to offer considerable tax incentives to 
make people save (for instance, the success of Riester pensions in Germany reflects 
the innovative subsidies offered), and in some cases when this failed they have had 
to auto-enrol individuals into personal pensions (see NEST in the UK and Kiwi-saver 
in New Zealand). 
3.3 How best to balance contributions to benefits?  
While it might seem directly related to choices made by policymakers on the relative 
scope of poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing, the decision on how best to 
balance contributions to benefits is, in many respects, separate. As Barr and 
Diamond (2008) state ―there are two polar extremes: benefits can be determined by 
past contributions and the returns on those contributions, in which case benefits can 
exceed or fall short of initial expectations; this is called a pure defined-contribution 
plan...or benefits can be determined on other criteria and guaranteed to be paid no 
matter what the eventual return on contributions: this is the definition of a pure 
defined-benefit plan.‖ 33 
The two approaches are quite different. In the first, pensions are to a great extent 
individualised, with little scope for redistribution intra- and inter-generationally. In the 
second, pensions for different persons can also be different (as they will satisfy the 
required criteria in different ways), but there is greater scope for redistribution. The 
risks borne by contributors are also different. In DC pensions, individuals face rate-of-
return risk, longevity risk, and unless there are generous crediting arrangements, 
labour market detachment risks. In DB systems, they do not face these risks to the 
same extent, though the parameters of the plan may be changed to account for 
them. As Barr (2013) in his study of the Swedish NDC pension system notes, ―the 
central idea that every krona of contribution for every person should count the same 
... embodies a self-imposed constraint that the costs of adjustment fall on current 
                                            
31
  For an overview of these episodes, see Barr and Diamond (2008), pp. 157-158. 
32
  See Barr (2013). 
33
  Barr and Diamond (2008), pp. 37. 
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contributors and pensioners ... since benefits are strictly related to contributions, the 
arrangement by implication gives fiscal sustainability priority over adequacy.‖ 
The shift towards DC schemes has occurred in both public and private plans. While it 
may appear in many respects to be due to plan sponsor concerns on the impact of 
longevity, there have been other drivers. In particular, it reflects the trend towards 
greater individualisation seen across the more developed regions since the 1980s. In 
this climate, having a pension system that forces everyone to retire at the same time 
and with similar benefits appeared to be a straitjacket. The concept that one‘s 
pension benefits will reflect the contributions one makes is intrinsically attractive and 
claims that a system is actuarially fair are bound to make it seem more equitable. 
However it is very hard in practise to achieve either actuarial fairness or actuarial 
neutrality.34 Take for instance, someone who retires under an NDC scheme. The 
scheme will assume the person will live a given set of years, but it is hardly likely that 
this will turn out to be correct. Similarly it is relatively hard to judge how best to 
ensure that the relative value of retirement benefits remains actuarially fair 
throughout retirement. Moreover a system which is completely inspired by this 
concept, of course, reproduces in retirement the same income inequity present in 
working age.  
Reflecting these concerns, in some countries (notably Sweden), policymakers have 
allowed horizontal redistribution, giving credits for care and unemployment. They 
have also sought to provide a good safety net. In others (e.g. Poland), these 
provisions do not appear that strong and may give rise to gender (and overall) equity 
issues in coming decades.35 Similarly the imposition of one access age for benefits 
has been addressed in some countries. Those with DC or NDC have flexible 
retirement ages, while many DB schemes now have bonus/malus features (in many 
cases with uneven schedules favouring late retirement).36 Relying overly on the 
rationality of individuals and assuming they will accept lower living standards if they 
appear to be caused by their own labour market and investment decisions, may 
however be optimistic. As IMF (2012) points out ―that while in most countries there 
will be no legal obligation for government to step in, a contingent liability could arise 
from an implicit social obligation of the pension system to ensure adequate income in 
retirement, especially for low-income groups‖. In many cases, the decision to 
contribute or not, and the wage an individual contributes on, is hardly completely in 
one‘s discretion.  
One aspect that is frequently forgotten is that a fully actuarially fair system may be 
unnecessarily inflexible. It might be better for an economy if adjustment is staggered 
over a period of time. This idea of optimal tax smoothing underpins a number of pre-
funding arrangements, for instance the US‘s Social Security Trust Fund arrangement. 
                                            
34
  See Queisser and Whitehouse (2006). 
35
  See Grech (2012). 
36
  Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) suggest pensions should be reduced by 8% for every year 
before age 65, but that OECD countries, on average, reduce them by just 5%. 
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The idea is that plan sponsors carry out regular long-term assessments and enact 
the required changes smoothly in a way that does not place the whole burden on one 
particular generation. The criticism that these arrangements frequently fail to deliver 
the required changes due to political inaction is fair, but in truth it remains to be seen 
whether schemes with automatic adjustments will actually automatically adjust 
without any problems. 
3.4 Can the system be made more responsive to demography 
and other risks? 
Were economic and social changes fairly easy to forecast, forward-looking 
policymakers would be able to develop the right balance between contributions and 
benefits. Experience has shown how naive this assumption is. Even something that 
historically has been fairly stable, longevity, has managed to befuddle actuaries. Few 
would have guessed a couple of decades ago that about one-third of babies born in 
2012 in the UK are expected to become centenarians.37 Likewise the social planners 
of the 1940s and 1950s were taken by surprise by the Baby Boom, as fertility is 
another supposedly stable phenomenon. The same surprises occurred in economic 
variables, such as output growth and inflation. Time and time again forecasters failed 
to indicate large turning points, such as the high inflation and unemployment in the 
1970s and the great recession of the late 2000s.  
Initially the main concern for policymakers was how to ensure that rapid economic 
growth or inflation would not erode the relative value of pensions. This contributed to 
the setting up of post-retirement indexation. However, the growing realisation of the 
possible impact of longevity soon turned the focus on how to reduce financial 
pressures. In fact, one of the most frequent reforms has been to reduce indexation to 
be below wage growth. In the long run, this can have very substantial effects. In the 
UK, the state pension in a matter of less than two decades fell from over a third of the 
average wage to closer to one-sixth. Some countries with DB systems have also 
changed the valorisation of earnings; that is they no longer fully adjust past earnings 
to take into account of changes in living standards between the time pension rights 
accrue and when they are claimed. A more hotly debated topic has been the 
adjustment of the pension age, even though most advanced economies have done 
this. Initially this has mostly concerned the equalising of pension ages between 
genders, soon followed by an increase for both genders. In many cases this change 
was heavily contested and was placed far in the future (for instance in the US the 
change was announced twenty years in advance). This has changed in recent years, 
with countries pushing changes more rapidly (for instance the pension age in 
Germany will be 67 at about the same time as in the US, even though the latter 
                                            
37
  Unforeseen longevity developments are not necessarily an upside risk. For instance, few 
would have foreseen that male life expectancy in the Russian Federation, after having risen by 
ten years between 1950 and 1990, would have fallen by more than five years between 1990 
and 2005. Similarly in South Africa, after having increased by 20 years between 1950 and 
1995, female life expectancy fell by 13 years between 1995 and 2010.  
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enacted the change decades earlier). In others, such as the UK, governments have 
quickened the pace of already announced pension age changes. 
The political complexity of changing pension age as well as concerns that 
policymakers may be caught out again by an unexpected rise in longevity have 
heightened interest in automatic mechanisms.38 Countries like Denmark, Greece and 
the Netherlands have specified an amount of years for which pensions are to be 
paid, and mandated changes in the pension age if longevity increases this period. In 
NDC and DC systems, retiring at the same age despite higher life expectancy 
automatically lowers benefits. Less well-known are more complex automatic 
adjustments that affect valorisation or post-retirement indexation. For instance, in 
Portugal new old-age pensions are adjusted downwards on the basis of how life 
expectancy at 65 in the year before pension entitlement compares with that observed 
in 2006. In Japan the adjustment is conducted on the basis of changes in the system 
dependency ratio: i.e. when the number of beneficiaries to contributors increases the 
pension is reduced. In Germany, instead, indexation is adjusted by the ratio between 
the sum of pension expenditure and that of contributions. The Swedish automatic 
balancing mechanism is even more complex, adjusting the notional interest (i.e. the 
valorisation of contributions) whenever there is a projected deficit between projected 
revenues and outlays. In Canada, the adjustment takes the form of either freezing 
indexation or else raising the contribution rate.  
The main risk of automatic mechanisms that impact solely on pensions-in-payment is 
that they could make them inadequate, particularly for the very elderly. This solution 
appears quite sub-optimal as these pensioners can take very little action to remedy 
for increasing longevity. Adjustments of the pension age are less inequitable, though 
to be economically effective, many countries would need to carry out substantial 
labour reforms to raise effective retirement ages. Countries like Italy or Greece, 
where according to Eurostat the duration of the working life is of just 30 and 32 out of 
the possible 49 years between age 16 and 65, may have automatically indexed 
pension ages, but it is clear that unless something major changes individuals will just 
end up exiting the labour force on other benefits. Adjustments that affect valorisation, 
or like in France the link between longevity and the contribution years required to get 
a full pension, could possibly induce economic behaviour changes, such as working 
longer or saving more. However to be effective, individuals need to be made quite 
aware of these complexities and be in a position to respond to incentives. 
3.5 Is the country able to handle the pension reform? 
The increasing complexity of pension systems leads to an important, but frequently 
ignored, policy question; namely whether a country can implement optimally a 
proposed reform. Pension systems may look great on paper, but unless policymakers 
can implement them effectively, they will fail or lead to ad-hoc and inconsistent 
                                            
38
  See for instance European Commission (2012), pp. 93-95. 
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adjustments or, worse still, policy reversals. There are several examples of such 
failures occurring in developed economies which supposedly had the right 
conditions.39 For instance, in Poland, despite considerable emphasis on building the 
administrative infrastructure, the introduction of the NDC scheme nearly failed due to 
issues with the implementation of the new computer system, compliance problems 
and administrative inefficiency. In Chile, the individual accounts system did not 
reduce the large informal sector and the state had to come in to pay more generous 
minimum pensions once people started to retire on the new system. In Sweden after 
initial strong interest in the personal accounts part of the system, the bulk of 
contributors gradually stopped making an active investment choice. 
As Barr and Diamond (2008) emphasise, ―effective reform requires at least three sets 
of skills: in policy design, administrative and technical implementation, and political 
implementation‖.40 They point that if implementation issues are not given importance 
at the design stage but treated as an add-on, this is a recipe for disaster. These 
considerations reflect the main conclusions of the World Bank‘s assessment of its 
pension policy assistance (World Bank (2006)); namely that ―to ensure well-tailored 
assistance to country conditions and consistent policy prescriptions, the Bank needs 
to implement guidelines for Bank staff for the development of pension operations, 
paying more attention to the minimum macroeconomic and financial sector 
preconditions necessary for multi-pillar reforms‖. The review also stresses the need 
that ―the Bank needs to ensure that client capacity to implement pension reform is 
adequate‖ and the need to focus on ―consensus-building among stakeholders‖. 
Among the important lessons are that decentralised systems have been costly and 
not necessarily have led to the enhanced competition and improved performance that 
reformers had foreseen. Centralised systems, while more cost-efficient in the long 
run, require a significant start-up cost and considerable institutional effort in the short-
term. Rather than assume away the underlying economic and social conditions of a 
country, such as the size of the informal sector and the development of its financial 
industry, reforms need to take these into careful consideration. The assumption that 
individuals will change behaviour once a new system is in place has hardly been 
realised, even in the face of supposedly strong financial incentives. Behavioural 
economics has provided us with a substantial number of explanations of why what 
appears irrational behaviour is in fact perfectly rational. Pension reforms need to be 
part of holistic economic reforms, which involve amongst other things active labour 
market policies, welfare benefit reforms, financial education campaigns and an 
overhaul of financial sector regulation and oversight. It also does not make sense to 
ignore transition costs, particularly the impact on government finances of pre-funding 
future pension claims. 
                                            
39
  See Fultz & Stanovnik (2004). 
40
  Barr and Diamond (2008), pp. 151. 
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Finally policymakers need to work towards achieving as wide a consensus as 
possible and try to achieve changes that prove long-lasting. Typically this process 
has been facilitated by setting up technical or bipartisan commissions (e.g. the UK 
Pensions Commission was formed by three respected representatives of employers, 
trade unions and academia, while the Greenspan Commission in the US included 
members appointed by both parties who were in close contact with their party 
leaders). These commissions placed significant emphasis on proving the case for 
reform and being recognised as the national experts on the subject. Equally as 
important is the need to have a good degree of political debate and possibly even 
more crucial is the process of public discussion and information dissemination. One 
common thread uniting pension policy reversals is that reforms had been 
ideologically driven, with some inspired by external experts relatively unfamiliar with 
the country‘s conditions, and that very often little was done to ensure that citizens 
were adjusting in the right way.41 
4 Conclusion 
The last two decades have been characterised by significant changes in national 
pension arrangements. While at first, a consensus seemed to be evolving around a 
one-size-fits-all reform, more recently the trend has been towards a better 
customisation of reforms. In the face of pressures from the ageing transition, the role 
of state pensions appears to still be on a diminishing path, but there has been a 
growing realisation of the importance of ensuring that pensions remain adequate. 
There has been increased interest in setting up innovative minimum pension 
schemes and providing contribution credits for periods of childcare and 
unemployment. The expanding role of private pensions in providing income 
smoothing has led to governments intervening more in their regulation and 
performance monitoring. Here again, the initial focus on decentralised provision is 
now changing to reflect concerns about administrative costs and the relative lack of 
engagement of citizens in active investment. 
While there still is a strong interest in (and great faith in the promise of) automatic 
adjustment mechanisms, there is greater understanding of the fact that for economic 
behaviour to change optimally, the state needs to engage more with its citizens. 
Policymakers have increasingly recognised that what really matters is that future 
generations need to be put in a position to accommodate the economic pressure of 
having a larger dependent population. While changes to the pension system can help 
achieve this, by, for instance removing incentives to retire too early or by aligning 
better the generosity of benefits to contributions made, there will need to be a much 
broader policy response. 
                                            
41
  For instance, Chlon-Dominczak (2000) notes how while surveys in Poland showed that ―most 
people felt they were well informed and that information on the pension reform was readily 
available‖, they also indicated ―that the knowledge of the pension system was limited to 
slogans rather than a deep understanding‖. The study also finds that ―a significant proportion 
of people simply joined the pension fund of the first agent they came across‖.  
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